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Should Prisoners Be Permitted to
Serve as Subjects of Research?
Larry I. Palmer
Editor's note: This is a revised and condensed version of a
paper Professor Palmer delivered on January 7, 1976, to the
National Minority Conference on Human Experimentation
sponsored by the National Urban Coalition.
Suppose a drug manufacturer wants to test the toxicity of a
new drug that will relieve the discomforts of common colds.
Suppose a leading cancer researcher needs healthy people
for a study to determine if cancer can be transmitted by
inoculation of "live cancer cells."
~Suppose a psychologist wants to
determine if a drug is as effective
a means of controlling assaultive
acts as is solitary confinement in a
maximum security prison. Suppose a university researcher wants
to administer a questionnaire to
female prisoners concerning the
uncertain lives of their children.
Should prisoners be permitted
to serve as subjects for proposed
research of the foregoing kinds?
The simple answer is that it all
depends. But on what? And there
simplicity ends. The interests involved must be identified, evaluated, weighed, and balanced. But
this will not be enough, for the combinations of interests
and the conflicts between them depend on the nature of the
proposed research and other factors. Thus differential analyses, not some single general answer, are called for. For
example, we should allow prisoners to consent to be interviewed for research on prison life but not to be experimented on with dangerous drugs.
The issues are not merely academic. Considerable research
already occurs in prisons, and proposals for further research
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are reguiarly made to prison officials throughout the country.
On July 12, 1974, Congress passed Public Law 93-348,
which established the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The commission was instructed to study a variety of
ethical and legal issues surrounding human experimentation
including issues of fetal research and psychosurgery and the
effects of experimentation on the delivery of health care.
The commission was also instructed to determine the requirements of informed consent for
experiments on prisoners, children, and the mentally ill.
It is evident that the commission and any person confronting
the problem of use of prisoners
in research must at the outset
take into account the interest individ~al prisoners have in being
treated as human beings, worthy
of respect. They have an interest
in being allowed to exercise free
choice in deciding whether to
participate in a research project,
I
for above all, a human being is a
self-determining being.
Autonomy is of special sig..
nificance to a prisoner, for prisoners have little to make choices about.
People who propose using prisoners for research should
be mindful that several factors diminish the likelihood that
a prisoner's consent will be as voluntary as that of a nonprisoner. The wages prisoners receive are extraordinarily
low; yet prisoners need money for the few luxuries of prison
life-cigarettes, for example. Thus prisoners are specially
vulnerable to monetary research inducements. Also, there is
little to do in prison. Prisoners might volunteer simply to es-

cape the boredom of prison life. Further, conditioas in
most of our prisons are such that some prisoners will readily
volunteer if the research gives them the opportunity to be
isolated from more violent and aggressive prisoners. To the
extent such factors influence prisoners' decisions to participate in research, those choices are less voluntary than would
be choices of nonprisoners.
Another aspect of the prisoner's interest in genuinely
choosing whether to participate in research is one that applies also to people out of prison. Consent is always given
to something, and it is in the nature of some research that
the parties proposing it cannot fully describe for the prisoner
all that will be involved. It goes without saying that there
can be no such thing as genuine assent to unknown risks. Of
course, researchers should be required to be as specific as
possible about known risks, both short run and long run.
Sometimes risks can be described in advance only in general
terms. Is assent genuine when this is so ? Certainly in the
optimal case of genuine assent the prisoner would be faithfully told all that might happen to him, and with precise
predictive accuracy.
Still another aspect of the prisoner's interest in genuinely
assenting is the individual's capacity for such assent. Surely
those who for psychological reasons might not be able to
exercise a considered judgment should be removed from
the pool of research prospects. Analogously, it may be that
some prisoners are more or less by nature averse to longterm risks. When this can be reliably determined, they too
should be removed from the pool of research prospects, at
least whenever the research project involves such risks. The
rationale for such actions calls forth a second basic interest
of both prisoners and society, namely the interest in not taking advantage of demonstrated human weakness. If it be
objected that this is paternalism, it is of a kind borne of a
concern for those who have dramatically evinced the relevant weaknesses.
Besides the foregoing interests, there are still others. Even
if the conditions for genuine assent are present, and a pool
of potential volunteers is readily identifiable, there will still
be some forms of research that our society should not permit anyone to do on human beings. Among other things, it
must be remembered that what research the state permits in
prisons will have symbolic significances in the larger society.
The symbolism takes on special meaning, too, given the·
proportion of minority groups incarcerated in our prisons.

By almost any definition of disadvantaged or minority,
the majority of our prisoners are disadvantaged. The problem of the use of racial or other minorities as experimental
subjects looms large in our culture also because of our experience with the Nazi concentration camp experiments. It behooves a country that has used the sanctions of law against
the Nazi scientists to avoid using the disadvantaged in its
own society for scientific experiments in which nonprisoners
would not willingly participate.
Also, the use of such drastic "experimental" techniques
as psychosurgery ought not to be permitted in prisons until
the techniques are adequately developed and determined to
be effective with noninstitutional patients. The evidence
indicates that the effectiveness of psychosurgery as treatment
is not yet known. Hence, it should not be used, even on
"consenting" prisoners.

Sentencing Goals
Society has, of course, reasons for imprisoning people and
an interest in the fulfillment of sentencing go;;.ls. The pool
of prospective volunteers should not be developed without
regard to possible inconsistencies between the nature of the
proposed research and the sentencing goals as they apply
concretely to an individual. When there is significant inconsistency in a particular case, the individual should be removed from the potential volunteer pool.
Above all, participation in scientific research should not
become a substitute for fulfillment of sentencing goals. Consider this extreme example: A prisoner on death row may be
willing to incur great risk of personal harm in a research
project in substitution for the death penalty. Should he be
·permitted to do so ? Surely not. Assuming the death penalty
in this case is imposed partly as a deterrent to others, it
would frustrate this goal to permit the substitution.
Perhaps the nature of the particular sentencing goal
should be taken into account, and if that goal is of little
importance to society, it may be that we should discount the
inconsistency. Consider for example, whether the inmates of
a city jail should be used in a controlled experiment involving heroin maintenance. If the purpose of legal confinement
of heroin addicts is to treat them, would an administrator of
the jail be justified in deciding that a pilot program might
be tried ? The answer to this question depends on one's
theories of heroin addiction, on one's attitude toward the
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prevailing ethic of treatment of prisoners, which is under
heavy attack, and on one's attitude about the efficacy of the
alternatives-jail, methadone treatment, or outright release.
So far nothing has been said about the societal interest
in the advancement of scientific knowledge. Were it not for
this interest, there could be no justification for research on
prisoners. Yet, this is neither a monolithic nor an overriding
interest. There are many varieties of knowledge, some worth
less than others. In judging research proposals, one should
consider the nature of the knowledge involved. Even when
it is plain that the research payoff may be great, it hardly
follows that this interest should be simply weighed and
balanced against any and all other interests that happen to
conflict.
A Need for Priority Principles
In my scheme of values, and I hope in that of others, I
see a need for priority principles as well as for a balancing
calculus. .And these are not alternatives. Balancing is simply
not appropriate with respect to some conflicting interests.
For example, if conditions for genuine assent are significantly absent, the research should not go forward, regardless
of the prospective gains in knowledge. Or if the research
plainly involves a significant risk of long-term physical or
psychological harm, again it should not be permitted, regardless of its importance. Or if the research plainly conflicts in significant ways with relevant sentencing goals, the
proposal should be turned down.
These are priority principles, not balancing maxims. Such
principles give priority to basic interests. It may be true that
balancing is necessary to arrive at priority principles in the
first place, but this is an entirely different matter from that
of balancing conflicting interests in assessing research proposals case by case. There will be cases where balancing will
be appropriate. The priority principles do not control all the
cases.
In sum, for decision makers to make sound judgments
about the conduct of prison research, we must perform a
variety of tasks: We must gather relevant facts about prison
conditions, prison populations, research activities, and administrative personnel. Using these facts, we must identify
the various interests involved. Then we must evaluate and
weigh these interests. The inevitability of conflicting interests in particular cases must be considered and any priority
8

principles devised. In devising such principles, we will also
be determining the proper scope for a balancing approach
to the assessment of particular research proposals.
Before closing, I want to underscore the problems of research administration and implementation. Plainly, something should tum on the kind of personnel who are to
assess proposals in the first place and the nature of the procedures they are to follow in doing so. We should design
procedures that allow for continual review of the research
that occurs in prisons; and we should assure that prisoners have full access to courts, commissions, and legislative
committees. Furthermore, where the research proposal involves some risks of harm to participants, something should
turn on the nature of the safeguards built into the proposal
to combat and minimize these risks.
The recently established commission, and any others that
may succeed it, are unlik~ly to provide answers to questions
about whether and when prisoners should be used as experimental subjects. We are just beginning the necessary societal inquiry and review. We are likely to find ourselves in a
long period of inquiry. This inquiry is long overdue and
should have begun when we punished Nazi doctors and
scientists at the conclusion of World War II for their
crimes against humanity.

Professor Palmer teaches criminal law
and procedure and gives a seminar on
human experimentation.

